Where assignor has a perfected security interest in Certificate of Deposit prior to its assignment, the assignee remains perfected against the creditors and transferres of the original debtor even though the Certificate of Deposit remains in the custody and control of the assignor. In re Fewell, 352 B.R. 98 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
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Opinions
Notice: Not all of the Judges Opinions will be made available on this site. Individual Judges have the option of specifying that all, some or none of their opinions be posted.
Audrey R. Evans
Motion to reopen granted to allow Debtor to receive a discharge where Debtor had filed Official Form 23, Debtor’s Certification of Completion of Instructional Course Concerning Personal Financial Management, after the case had closed without a discharge. However, Court did not grant motion to continue the automatic stay because the automatic stay had expired upon the closing of the case pursuant to § 362(c)(2)(A), and reopening the case does not automatically cause the automatic stay to become effective again. Not selected for publication.
Mr. Angeleri required to show cause why he should not be suspended from practicing law in the Arkansas Bankruptcy Courts in accordance with Local Rule 2090-2 until the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct reaches a decision on the Court's complaint (arising from Judge Evans' April 26, 2006 Opinion and Judge Mixon's referrals in the Binns and Ersery cases).
See April 26, 2006 Bost opinion below.
Mr. Angeleri required to show cause why he should not be suspended from practicing law in the Arkansas Bankruptcy Courts in accordance with Local Rule 2090-2 until the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct reaches a decision on the Court's complaint (arising from Judge Evans' April 26, 2006 Opinion and Judge Mixon's referrals in the Binns and Ersery cases).
See April 26, 2006 Bost opinion below.
Mr. Angeleri required to show cause why he should not be suspended from practicing law in the Arkansas Bankruptcy Courts in accordance with Local Rule 2090-2 until the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct reaches a decision on the Court's complaint (arising from Judge Evans' April 26, 2006 Opinion and Judge Mixon's referrals in the Binns and Ersery cases).
See April 26, 2006 Bost opinion below.
Debtors’ counsel filed a Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay prior to the expiration of the automatic stay (to the extent provided in section 362(c)(3)(A)), but counsel noticed the motions out for a period that extended beyond the expiration of the thirty day automatic stay. Accordingly, the Court held that it could not extend the stay once expired, and also noted that it could not impose a stay because a motion to impose the stay had not been timely filed under section 362(c)(4). Orders amended to reflect that reference to procedure posted on website is only that of Judge Evans. Not selected for publication.
Debtors’ counsel filed a Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay prior to the expiration of the automatic stay (to the extent provided in section 362(c)(3)(A)), but counsel noticed the motions out for a period that extended beyond the expiration of the thirty day automatic stay. Accordingly, the Court held that it could not extend the stay once expired, and also noted that it could not impose a stay because a motion to impose the stay had not been timely filed under section 362(c)(4). Orders amended to reflect that reference to procedure posted on website is only that of Judge Evans. Not selected for publication.
Court found that under the facts of this case, a real estate installment contract was not a mortgage or mortgage substitute under Arkansas law, but was an executory contract with a valid forfeiture clause. Because the forfeiture clause was not waived by the sellers, and the sellers canceled the contract prior to the Debtor's bankruptcy filing, the Court found that the Debtors had no equitable or legal interest in the property. 345 B.R. 656 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
In overruling Creditor's Objection to Confirmation of Plan, the Court adopted the legal analysis of § 1322(c)(2) in In re Young, 199 B.R. 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) and found that § 1322(c)(2) permits the bifurcation of an undersecured mortgage on a Chapter 13 debtor's principal residence when the mortgage matured before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Not selected for publication.
Judge Richard D. Taylor
Court determined that corporate officer/debtor was personally liable for insufficient funds checks written on the company account, and that the resulting debt was non-dischargeable in the debtor’s personal bankruptcy case under § 523(a)(2)(A).