In re Betty Faye Brown. Where Debtor’s rights in her residence were extinguished under Arkansas' Statutory Foreclosure Act prior to Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the residence was not property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and this Court had no jurisdiction to alter Creditor’s rights in the Property through a confirmed chapter 13 plan. Not selected for publication.
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Opinions
Notice: Not all of the Judges Opinions will be made available on this site. Individual Judges have the option of specifying that all, some or none of their opinions be posted.
Audrey R. Evans
Bryant, et al. v. Rosslare, et al. (In re Truly). The Court Granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees. The Court found that reasonable attorney fees and costs should be awarded to Plaintiffs in defending removal to this Court where at the time the Removing Defendants filed their Notice of Removal, they had no objectively reasonable grounds to believe that the removal was legally proper. Not selected for publication.
Even though Chapter 13 Trustee held sufficient funds to pay all allowed claims, the court granted Debtor's motion to dismiss their case prior to payment; however, dismissal was conditioned for cause pursuant to 11 U.S.C. s. 349(b) on payment of all allowed claims and retention by the Chapter 13 Trustee of any remaining funds for resolution of outstanding claim based on pending state court lawsuit. Not selected for publication. Affirmed on appeal to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
Bryant, et al. v. Rosslare, et al. (In re Truly). Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand to State Court was Granted. Despite having “related to” jurisdiction in this matter, the Court exercised its powers of discretionary abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) and remanded this case to the Greene County Circuit Court on equitable grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) where federal preemption did not provide the basis for the bankruptcy court to retain jurisdiction over this case. The Court also found that the Defendants, having previously asserted in their written pleadings to this Court that this was a non-core proceeding, were estopped from arguing that this was a core proceeding at the hearing. Not selected for publication.
Court sustained Chapter 13 Trustee's objection to confirmation under 11 U.S.C. s. 1325(b) which requires all of debtors' projected disposable income to be paid into the plan during the first three years. Court found that some of Debtors' expenses were not reasonable and necessary such that Debtors could pay more into their plan and make a larger distribution to their creditors. Not selected for publication.
In re Schultz, Order Denying Motion to Reconsider. Court clarified earlier ruling that late claims may be allowed and distributions made thereon pursuant to 11 U.S.C. s. 726(a), and that claims filed after the Court issued an outdated and incorrect "Second Notice of Assets" would not be disallowed. Not selected for publication.
In re Schultz, Order Striking Second Notice of Assets and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Debtor's Amended Objection to the Trustee's Request for Issuance of a Notice of Assets and For the Establishing of a Claims Bar Date. Although Court found that an outdated "Second Notice of Assets" referring to incorrect or no longer existing bankruptcy rules should be stricken from the case docket, the Court refused to disallow late claims which were filed after the Second Notice of Assets was issued because late claims may be allowed and distributions made thereon pursuant to 11 U.S.C. s. 726(a). Not selected for publication.
Judge Richard D. Taylor
Collateral estoppel doctrine precludes court from hearing complaint for willful and malicious injury because same issue was determined by state court.
Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over chapter 7 trustee's claim for damages against the IRS because trustee failed to exhaust her administrative remedies within the Internal Revenue Service.
Court recharacterized and equitably subordinated creditor claims in debtor's chapter 11 proceeding after finding that creditor and debtor attempted to treat as secured debt a financing transaction designed to pay shareholders interest on their accumulated equity while also judgment-proofing the debtor.