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Notice: Not all of the Judges Opinions will be made available on this site. Individual Judges have the option of specifying that all, some or none of their opinions be posted.

Audrey R. Evans

In re Schultz, Order Striking Second Notice of Assets and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Debtor's Amended Objection to the Trustee's Request for Issuance of a Notice of Assets and For the Establishing of a Claims Bar Date.   Although Court found that an outdated "Second Notice of Assets" referring to incorrect or no longer existing bankruptcy rules should be stricken from the case docket, the Court refused to disallow late claims which were filed after the Second Notice of Assets was issued because late claims may be allowed and distributions made thereon pursuant to 11 U.S.C. s. 726(a).    Not selected for publication.

Court denied the Motion to deem requests for admissions as admitted. Even though response to request for admissions was untimely, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b) provides the authority for a court to permit a party to respond to a request for admissions after the expiration of the time afforded by Rule 36 in cases where the opposing party is not prejudiced by allowing untimely responses, and the presentation of the merits of the action would be otherwise assisted. Not selected for publication.

Trustee is not required to bring a fraudulent conveyance action to set aside a trust where the Debtor's interest in the trust is property of Debtor's estate under 11 U.S.C. s. 541. (Supplemental Memorandum Opinion to Memorandum Opinion entered April 25, 2005). In re Schultz, 324 B.R. 722 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).

Court found that a legal description in a deed which listed the proper address and county but the wrong city created a valid lien under Arkansas law because the description given was sufficient to specifically identify the subject property despite providing an inaccurate city name.

Trustee's objection to exemptions sustained; Debtor's interest in entire trust corpus of trust funded with his own assets included in his bankruptcy estate despite spendthrift and anti-alienation provision. In re Schultz, 324 B.R. 712 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).

In re Deborah Renae Smith. Motion to set aside discharge order and motion for expedited hearing denied where debtor wished to set aside discharge order for the sole purpose of extending time within which debtor could rescind her reaffirmation agreement. Insufficient facts alleged which would justify setting aside discharge order under Bankruptcy Rule 9024. Even if additional facts had been alleged, case law does not support setting aside discharge order to permit modification/rescission of reaffirmation agreement once deadline as stated in 11 U.S.C. 524(c)(4) has passed. Not selected for publication.

Judge Richard D. Taylor

Default judgment obtained in state court was not sufficient for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel or res judicata when three counts were alleged in state court complaint but order for default did not specify whether fraud was “essential to the judgment.” Summary judgment granted based on uncontroverted statement of undisputed facts.

Objection to chapter 13 plan language that imposes affirmative duty on creditor to disclose post-petition fees sustained.

Denial of motion to reconsider order dated March 4, 2005.

Debtor is entitled to Arkansas homestead exemption because she is head of household, occupies the property as her home, and is a resident of Arkansas.